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Homicide-Appeal--Review of Evidence.-Where
testified that blow she

in evidence was for triers
ment of conviction of uwcu~l"'L'fS
sume that
believed
of oceurrenees on
Criminal Law-Trial-Offer of Evidence-RenewaL-Where
court
evidence
or withholds decision as to
its admissibility,
to introduce such evidence
should rene\,- his
court's attention to fact that
definite decision is desired.
[3] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.J;;xclusion of evidence in homicide case, offered in
of
theory of necessary self-defense, that about two years prior
to homicide physician had found defendant in very run-down
eondltion due to glandular disturbances which caused her to
he emotionally unstable and that
had reported such
condition to defendant's husband, victim of homicide, was not
prejudicial error where other
as to defendant's
physical condition over the years was
in evidence.
[4] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where court in
homicide case gave 20 general instructions on self-defense most
of which impartially stated law on subject, and in addition two
"prosecution-slanted' instructions, refusal to give two "defense-slanted" instructions could not alone have so prejudiced
defendant as to warrant reversal of judgment of conviction of
manslaughter.
!d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-Where self-defense was relied on by defendant in homicide case, and question
whether she or her husband, the
was aggressor was a
issue in case, the giving of two instructions as to use of
deadly weapon by defendant, stating the rule negatively and
from viewpoint of prosecution, and failure to give the two re-

McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 251;
Criminal Law,
§ 269; [3] Homicide, § 266; [ 4-6] Homicide § 267; [7] Homicide,
§ 207; [8] Criminal Law, § 734.

G18
error
haYe
favor of
[6] !d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.--Pailure to
instruction m homicide case as to influence of antecedent
threats on
of self-defense
defendant's
defendant's life
defendant
of crime deceased had assaulted ULL~~"'uacu
!d.-Instructions-Self-defense.-\Vherc defendant's uu," IJi)IHU
court order from molestof crime came to house in Yiolation
such
and oYer defendant's
that she did not
want to see him, pounded door
cmtrance, ran
rooms in house and
portion of
instruction
that right of self-defense does not exist as
person
in threat<ming or
to threaten
injury, is acting lawfully, was error.
[8] Criminal I.aw-Instructions-Applicability to Evidence.-An
instruction, though correct statement of abstract proposition
of
is improper when it finds no support in evidence, and
is ground for reversal if it is calculated to mislead

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Charles \V. Fricke, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder
slaughter, reversed.

,Judgment of conviction of man-

\V ard Sullivan, Dockweiler & Dockwei1er and Frederick
C. Dockweiler for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow,
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, Robert \Vheeler and J.
Miller Leavy, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Patricia Gallagher Moore, appeals from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter and
from an order denying her motion for a new trial. (Defendant
was charged by information with the crime of murder; the
jury returned a verdict of manslaughter.)
[7] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 125

et seq.
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Dr. Telford I.
been previously
Mrs.
married and each
JVJ:oore's
Antonia
years of age;
Dr. Moore
was 16 years of age. Dr. and Mrs.
In
after Dr. Moore's
the
moved to
an office for the
with the children,
office
Mrs.
Moore ·worked in the
under her maiden name, and in
the
for the
In 1948, due to long hours
of work and abusive treatment from her husband, Mrs. Moore
had a nervous breakdown and was under the care of three
vvho gaYe her "shock" treatments. Defendant
eeaf':ed work at that time for three months but Dr. Moore
brought home office books and records for her to keep at
home. At about this
Dr. Moore
giving defendant
large doses of sedatiYes and narcotics. At this time, the couple
owned quite a large home whieh Mrs. Moore was endeavoring
to keep up with
spasmodic help. Defendant repeatedly
requested permission to cease working in the doctor's office
so that she might devote her entire time to caring for the
home and the children. These requests were the subject of
many heated and abnsiYe arguments and were refused until
approximately the first of April, 1951.
In October, 1949, another woman was hired to assist Mrs.
and in ,June, 1951, Mrs. Moore on the adMoore in the
·l'ice of her physicians took a trip to Hawaii with two of the
chihlren. She returned in July, 1951, having heard that her
husbaud was associating with a Mrs. Betty Blanchard. On
Angnst 27, 1951, defendant filed an action against Dr. Moore
for separate maintenance. After a hearing, the court made
its order directing Dr. Moore to leave the family home, to provide for the support of defendant and the child of the
couple, and prohibiting Dr. Moore from molesting the defendant. On December 7, 1951, at Dr. Moore's
the
couple entered into a reconciliation agreement and resumed
marital relations.
the agreement, defendant was given
the home and its furnishings. Dr. Moore moved out of the
home on ,January 14, 1952, and recorded a notice of rescission
of tl1e reconciliation agreement. Defendant's attorney had
many conferences with Dr. Moore in which he attempted.
without success, to obtain funds for Mrs. Moore. Finally,

not at home. She
and one
,Jnst aftrr
Mrs. Moore had driven
il1 an effort
find Mr. Blanchard
·who \Vas said not to be at
After the eaHs had been
the
rang nnd defendant answered it. Patrieia
·who was
and who testified to the above
also
tPstified that >Yllen defendant answered the phone, she heard
lwr say "I r1on 't want to see you," "That's
we haYe
" "Where are yon " and that defendant then rethe receiver. Defendant then told Patricia that Dr.
Moore
;
she did
want to see him ; that
he was in
and would arrive in about 15 minutes ..
Patricia then told defendant that Dr. Moore had called while
defendant
not at lwme and asked if she could be out
he
said he had been served

defendant wanted to
"this
OYer ann settled. Patricia tes;tified that she told him she knew
Mrs. Moore did want to
it settled because she eouldn 't
the
she
Dr.
and
and didn't
want to settle
;
she was
erm:.v and d~mented;
that she
told him that
fat't
he had
his wife on a "starvation
settled; that Dr. Moore
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to leave and meet
Mrs: Jones and
at
;
to meet them so that
that she would
Dr. Moore
,_.,"",.,,.,., was to stay in
the whole
could be settled ;
room
him.
her if she were
afraid of Dr. Moore corniillg
U.C••
said
she was} ''that
might
Defendant then
1=r r.lr"'<r""' to the Blanchards to
went downstairs and sent
for her.
After sending Patricia to care for Timmy, defendant went
to her room and procured the gun which had been given her
Police Officer Sawyer for her protection. As Patricia
heard the
goiilg
there was a loud pounding on the front door which stopped when
opened
it and said ''hello.'' After the front door closed, Patricia
heard some running around for about five minutes; then
something like ''thuds''; then a sound like someone falling
to
floor, and about a second later,
about the time I
heard Mrs. Moore scream, I heard a shot.''
Defendant
that when she
the door, she
had the gnn in her
hand which was hanging at her
side ; that she opened the door
her left hand. As she
opened the door Dr. Moore rushed through the house, running from the hall into the pantry, through the dining room,
back into the hall,
pantry and again into the
room where he hit
with his :fists, knocking her to
the floor so as to render her momentarily stunned and unconscious. The circumstantial evidence
that a bullet
from defendant's gun,
from the direction wl1ere she said
she was knocked
hit the
door from
dining
room into
pantry and ricocheted
Dr. Moore's body,
passing through both
of the aorta.
testified
that she tried to reach the
to go to
that she might lock
in; that as she approached the
stairway, she saw her husband
toward her with his
hands raised ; that she closed her eyes, squeezed the gun, dis.:;u•U.Q,LLl>

It appears, and the evidence \Vas
numerous persons that he was afraid that if he talked to her
he would kill her; that when another doctor remonstrated
\Vith him for
defendant such
doses of sodium
that he didn't care if he did kill
Other witnesses
bruised
and lacerated from blows
her
Dr. Moore.
'l'here was evidence
Dr. Moore had told defendant he
would mutilate
face ; that he would return and rake her
bones out of the ashes; that ''
'' would find her
m
the
; that he would rnn over her with
car.
in the house with de"'""""''"'" her from Dr. Moore and she testified that
she saw him pick defendant up and throw her across the room
into a chair. 1\ former
, testified that
he had
her the gun when he
on her person, evidence of a
administered
the deceased and after
she had told him that her
had threatened to do
away with her.
Defendant contends
evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict ; that the court erred in
certain
testimony; that the court erred in giving, and refusing to
give, certain instructions.

that at the time she shot her

court
evia decision as to its admissiintroduce the evidence should
or call the court's attention to the fact that
decision is desired.'
v.
51
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377
defendant's
condition over the years was admitted
in evidence and vvhile the
of Dr. Billig would have
been admissible under the rule of
v. Smith, 151 Cal.
619
P.
, relied upon
it does not appear
that its exclusion could have
her in any way.
INSTRUCTIONS ALLEGEDLY ERRONEOUSLY GIVEN

''The law does not
or
one who intends to
commit an assault upon another to
in advance his own
defense
a
or a combat with a view
thereby to create a situation wherein the infliction of the
intended
will appear to have been done in self-defense.''
''"Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel which leads
in his own defense of using force against
to the
his adversary, the
to stand his ground and thus defend
but, instead he
himself is not immediately available to
first must decline to carry on the affray, must honestly endeavor to escape from it, and must fairly and clearly inform
his adversary of his desire for peace and of his abandonment of the contest. Only when he has done so will the law
justify him in thereafter standing his ground and using force
upon his antagonist.''
The above-quoted instructions were given at the request
of the People. It is conceded that they are correct statements
of abstract propositions of law, but it is argued that there
was no evidence in the record that defendant sought or induced a quarrel with deceased. It is argued that Dr. Moore
had been restrained by court order from molesting defendant;
that the house had been given to her; that Dr. Moore called
defendant and told her, over her protests, that he was coming
to see her; that he ran through the house and that he struck
her causing her to fall to the floor before the shot was ftren.
On the other hand, it is argued that defendant met him at
the door with a gun.
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED AND ALLEGEDLY ERRONEOUSLY
REFUSED

(1) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Telford
Moore attempted to and was about to commit an assault upon
the defendant and that at the time he did so the defendant
had a right to repel and resist the assault of Telford Moore
and use all necessary force to repel the same."

525
unlawful
with
a violent
on the person of another.
''If you believe from the
or if you entertain a
reasonable doubt
that decedent ·was the aggressor
in the
or that he assaulted the person
the de:tencdant,
then the defendant was entitled under the law to invoke the
aid of self defense and iu so
she had the
to lawher may have apresort
such means and force as
peared necessary under all the circumstances
a reasonable
person to
or resist the same.
''If after a careful consideration of all the evidence, you
should believe therefrom, or if you should entertain a reasonable doubt therefrom, that the defendant herein was the
victim of an assault at the hands of decedent or if you believe
that the defendant at that time, as a reasonable person honestly
and in good faith believed herself to be the victim of such an
assault, although you might find that she was in fact mistaken, then you are instructed that she was entitled to act
upon such appearances with safety and defend herself, although it may afterwards have been shown that the appearances were not justified by the facts.''
( 3) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Telford
Moore was the first aggressor in the difficulty which resulted
in what occurred, then the defendant was not obliged to fly
or run, but had the right to stand her ground and repel any
assault or threatened assault.''
The trial court gave three instructions on the right of
self-defense which defendant concedes to be fair and impartial statements of the law on that subject. [4] The failure
to give the above three instructions is claimed to be prejjldicial
error when coupled with the instructions given on the subject at the request of the prosecution. Those two instructions,
it is claimed, state the position of the People and since they
were given, in order to achieve impartiality, the two requested
by defendant should have been given. The court gave, in all,
20 general instructions on self-defense most of which impartially state the law on the subject. In addition, the two
"prosecution-slanted" instructions which have been heretofore quoted were given. It would appear that the court's
refusal to give the two "defense-slanted" instructions could
not, alone, have so prejudiced defendant as to warrant a reversal of the judgment.

was
the defendant had
'-''"~Luuo further trouble
versary.''
Under the
defense is relied upon,
Dr. or Mrs. Moore was the
issues, if not the
the
of
of the

difference between
and
law favorable to one or the
every
lawyer
knows.
to self-defense should not
have been stated
from the
of the prosecution. There should be absolute
as between the
People aud the defendant in the matter of instructions, in-
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any
fend ant.

failure to
of the de-

evidence
instruction
failure to
prejudiced the defendant's
It is admitted that no instruction on the
was
"You
instruetefl that if you believe from the evidence
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the defendant Patricia
tm:·m.anon either from the deceased
aeau'"" her life or person made
she is justified in
more
harsher measures for her own protection in
than would a person '.vho had not
received such threats and if you should believe from the evidence that the deceased did make threats
the defendant
and because thereof defendant had reasonable cause to fear
than she would have had otherwise, you are
to take such facts into consideration in determining whether
defendant acted in a manner which a reasonable person would
act in
his or her own life or bodily safety.''
There was ample evidence in the record to justify giving
the above instruction which was held a proper one in People
v. Graham, 62 Cal.App 758, 765 [217 P. 823], and People v.
Bradfield, 30 Cal.App. 721, 727 [159 P. 443]. A judgment
of conviction of second degree murder was reversed in PeoplP
v. Torres, 94 Cal.App.2d 146 [210 P.2d 324], because of the
failure to
the same instruction. It vvas said there, "It
is conceded that no instruction was given with respect to the
influence of antecedent threats on the right of self-defense.
·where, as in this case, there is evidence tending to show the
making of threats of death or great~odily harm by deceased
against the defendant, which are re ~ed on as influencing or
justifying defendant's act, instruc ion on the law of this
subject is proper ( 41 C.J.S., Homicide, § 382, p. 185) and
if not covered a correct instruction on the subject proposed
by one of the parties should be given . . . . [T]he proposed
instruction would not tell the jury that under the circumstances mentioned the defendant would be justified in committing an assault with a deadly weapon in self-defense, but
only that the jury was 'to take such facts and circumstances
into . . . consideration in determining whether the defendant
acted in a manner in which a reasonable man would act in
protecting his own life or bodily safety.' Moreover, the well
known rule that each instruction need not contain a complete
statement of the law but that it is sufficient that all instructions taken
correctl.v do so, applies obviously also to
instructions proposed by a party and refused. Many more
instructions on self-defense were proposed and many were
given. The jury were instructed in the language of section
197, subdivision 3, Penal Code, that homicide is justifiable
in self-defense 'when there is reasonable ground to apprehend

529

Oct.

she >nus the aggressor.
self-defense
in Yiew of the facts
heretofore
of which
of the two ·was the
pointed out the
aggressor was of vital
The
influeuer of anteshould have been instrneted on
eedent threats so far as tJ1e conduct of defendant
herself with t1Je
weapon
the
in
concerned.
lNSTRUCTIOX Au~EGEDLY Ermo:~EOUSLY

''The right of self-defense exists
The
does not

ful attack.

acting
from molesting his
the order and
him. vVhen he
he ran
house and asf':anlted hiR
the instruction invited the
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door open for surmise and
: that
rffect was to
implant on the
the belief that the court
that
at the time of the
was
in lawful manner and that defendant's claim of self'"defense had no
basis in fact. Defendant
with
to t11is instruction seems meritorious. 'l'lle
counter ·with the
statement that even if the deceased 1rere
manner on the
in
the
that the right of self-defense exists
attack. It is true that the first sentence
ho;n•yer,
of the iustruetion deals
the second sentence and
with a person
bodily injury who is
and informs the jury that the
of self-defense does not
then exist. \V e find no
in the reeord for the second
part of the instruction. ']'he home
to defendant who
had told her husband l'lhe did not want to !'ICc him on that
It is true that subsequently shr told lwr friends to leave because her husband might not
if lw saw their ears in front
of the house, but so far as the deceased knPw when he
he was coming in violation not onl~· of hrr wishrR bnt of a
eourt order prohibiting him from
her. His <'onduct
after entering the house could not be said to be indieatiye of a
law-abiding nature. [8] An instrnetion which finds no
support in the record. even thm1gh a eorred statement of an
abstract proposition of law, is
1vhc>n it finds no support in the evidence, and it is grouml fo1· reYersal if it is calculated to mislead the jur~·
CaLTnr.
. In People
v. Silver, 16 Ca1.2c1 714. 723 [108 P.2d
, we said: "Where
errors in instructions occur, the
al'ways arises as to
whether or not they are prejudicial. H0re it may be said that
where the proof of a defendant's guilt is c1ear, and no extenuating circumstances appeae, snrh Prrors may not be prejudicial. But where a case, sneh as the one at bar, is what may
b0 tPrnwr1 a 'do;;;e' ease, and \Yherr thr e-rroneous instruction,;
eoneern matters vital to the dcfem:c of the defendant, and may
have resulted in a miscarriage of jm:tiee, we are of the opinion
that sueh errors must he regarded as prejudicial and should
result in a new trial for the defendant." (People v. Hamilton, 33 Cal.2d 45 [198 P.2d 873] ; Peoz?le v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d
880 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2c1. 401
[164 P.2d 753] .)
In summary, we finrl that t~Yo instructions on self-defense
were given from the viewpoint of the proseeution and, ·while
numerous instructions on that subjeet were given, no one of
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to have been stated favorably to the
or from that
of vie·w. An instruction on the ined
the defendant
flucnce of antecedent tln·eats \Yas
and refused
the trial court. Snell an instruction found
in the record. 1\n instruction which told the
of self-defem;e did not exist as against a
to threaten injury,
in the evidence.
that 1vhere the evidenee on the i;.;sue
or
of the
was the aggressor is as
balanced
as it is in this case and where there was euor in the giving and
of instructions on the vital matter of self-defense on
of the defendant that may have resulted in a misof
it must be coneltu1cd that the error· was
and slwuld result in a reversal of the judgment
awl the order
clefenda11t a new trial. (People v. Hilver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [108 P.2d 4]; People Y. Harnrilton, 38
Cal.2d 45 [198 P.2d
; People v. lV eathe1·[ord, 27 Cal.2d
401 [164 P.2d 758] .)
F'or the foregoing reasons, the jndgment and the order denying defendant's motion for a mw trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred.
SCHAUEH, ,J.-I dissent. In my opinion, examination of
the entire reeord in this ease impels the conclusion that no
error of any substance appears, that the evidence strongly
supports the verdict, and that no misearriage of justice has
ocenrred.
Much of the lengthy reporter's transcript is devoted to a
picture of the domestic relations of defendant and Dr. JYioore
to the killing of Dr. Moore on May 6, 1952. The diseord between them increased after defendant returned from
Hawaii in Jnly, 1951, instituted her separate maintenance
aetion against Dr. Moore, and hired detectives to follow Dr.
JYioore and to obtain recorded evidenee against him. It appears unnecessary to recount details of the various verbal
and physical altereations between defendant and Dr. JYioore
which appear in the record and a number of which are refen·ed to in the majority opinion.
It may be mentioned that the majority opinion states,
"A former police officer, Sawyer, testified that he had given
her the gun [which defendant thereafter used to shoot Dr.
JYioore] when he saw, on her person, evidence of a beating

tends
As

Defendant then
the gun, went downwith
. Moore's knock with it in
her hand.
After she had shot Dr. Moore defendant went to the teleor an ambulance, or call
but telephoned her friends
and Mrs. Blanchard.
this is Pat. I have just done
''You have done what, Pat?'' ; she
''I have shot Telford.'' Defendant in her conversation with Mrs. Blanchard called the latter a "lowdown
bitch'' and told her to send all defendant's friends back to
house.
defendant stated and testified that she recalled
one
it was
proved by physical
evidence that two shots had been fired; that the lethal bullet
was fired from the dining room toward the swinging door be-
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had his

into the entrance hal1, fired the
was still upright in the entrance
wall above him.
The jury were
warranted in
appeal we are bound to
the
mine-that on the
herself to meet Dr. Moore while she was in a
his asserted affair with Mrs. Blanchard and
to force Dr. Moore to go to the Blanchards
a '' shmvdown '';
that if at any time before Dr. Moore
defendant was
in fear, she could
the
to the
called
the police, or recalled the
Blancllards, but that she
these choices; that if the
doctor struck defendant before he was shot, he did so to protect himself and in an
to disarm defendant; that the
armed defendant did not act in necessary self-defense when
she killed the unarmed Dr. lYioore.
Contrary to defendant's pv'''"'"u,
evidence which
the
cededly correct statements of
opinion at page 524. From the
be inferred that
Dr.
the original
mn~ . .
a
that
aggressor in the
Dr. Moore should confront
husband of his asserted paramour, which she
have realized he would be
unwilling to do. After
her lack of fear of Dr.
Moore, refusjng the aid of her
and
clearing
ADNA,rl
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her house of potential witnesses, she armed herself with a
gun and displayed it when she
the door to Dr. Moore.
There is overwhelming evidence
of it from defendant
herself and from
made by her) that in previous
quarrels with the doctor, defendant had not merely persisted
in provocative abuse but had
the use of physical
violence and had made no effort to terminate 1he altercations.
The jury were justified in
that in this as in
altercations Mrs. Moore's conduct was
to provoke
rather than to avoid an
As appears from the majority
defendant vV'Cllf-'>O.Jl.UO
of the refusal of instructions
quoted at
pages 524, 525 of that opinion, ·which are phrased in terms of
the law applicable ''If the jury believe from the evidence
that Telford Moore attempted to and was about to commit
an assault upon defendant'' and ''If the jury believe from
the evidence that Telford Moore was the first aggressor."
Instructions which the trial court gave on the subject of selfdefense1 adequately and fairly cover the law on the subject
and are properly phrased to apply to whomever the jury
considered the instigator of the affray.
Defendant asserts that the giving of the instructions quoted
at pages 525, 526 of the majority opinion unduly emphasized
the prosecution point of view, and the majority, without suffi1

The trial court gave the following mstructions:
"It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted, and who has
reasonable ground for believing that bodily injury is about to be inflicted
upon him, to stand his ground and defend himself from such attack, and
in doing so he may nse all force and means which he believes to be
reasonably necessary and whieh would appear to a reasonable person,
in the same or similar cir0umstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury
which appears to be imminent.''
''A person who has been attaeke(l and who is exeTcising his right of
lawful self-defense is not required to retTeat, and he not only may stand
his ground and defend himself against the attack but may also pmsue
his assailant until he has secured himself from danger if that course
n,ppears to him, and would appear to a reasonable person in the same
situation, to he reasonably and apparently necessary; and this is his right
even though he might more easily llaYe gained safety by withdrawing
from the scene.''
''A person who withont fault on his part is
to a sudden
felonious attack need not retreat. In the exercise
his right of selfdefense he may stand his ground and defend himself
the use of
all force and means apparently necessary and which
appear to be
neeessary to a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same
knowledge; and he mny pmwe his nssailant until he has secured himself
from danger if that course likewise appears reasonably necessary. This
law applies even though the assailed person might more easily have
gained safety hy flight or hy withdrawmg from the scene."
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this argument. Defendant relies upon
v. Eslraclct (1923), 60 Cal.App. 447, 483 [213 P. 67],
v. Hatchett (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 158-159
, which emphasize that instructions should be
[146 P.2d
not
correct but also impartial in their point of view.
rrhat
of course, is true and should be strictly adhered
to
trial courts. In the Estrada case, however, the appellate
court concluded that the prosecution evidence showed that
acted only in
and in the Hatchett case
ihere vms evidence strongly tending to show that defendant
acted in self-defense and the charge to the jury not only
uu'"·"'''"" the prosecution's point of view in the instruction
self-defense but also contained various errors which,
the
court concluded, in combination required reversal. In the present case the charge as a whole is not ''prosecution slanted" and there is evidence which strongly tends
to show that the killing terminated the last of a long series
of altercations which were instigated at least as much by
defendant as by the husband she killed.
The majority opinion accepts defendant's argument that
the failure to give the requested instruction quoted at pages
527, 528 of that opinion substantially prejudices defendant.
The instruction, omitting the matter italicized and enclosed in
brackets, was as follows: "[I]f you believe from the evidence
that prior to the 6th day of May 1952, the defendant Patricia
G. Moore had received information, either from the deceased
or other persons, of threats against her life or person made
the deceased Telford I. Moore [and believed such threats
or waH thm·eby made more apprehensive of harm] she is justified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures
for her own protection in event of assault, than would a person
who had not received such threats and if you should believe
from the evidence that the deceased did make threats against
the defendant and because thereof defendant had reasonable
cause to [and did] fear greater peril than she would have
had otherwise, you are to take such facts into consideration
in determining whether defendant acted in a manner which
a reasonable person would act in protecting his or her own
life or bodily safety.''
Obviously the instruction as requested, lacking the qualifying element that the threats, if made and communicated to
defendant, were believed by her or at least made her more
apprehensive of peril, is not a complete and accurate statement of law. (People v. Gonzales (1887), 71 Cal. 569, 576

one
instructions
contain the element
belief or increased apprehension)
omitted from the
instruction and do not specifically
lU<Lhlug of threats or
translate those
into a formula instruction applicable only on a
resolution of the evidence favorable to the defendant. Such
as
are as follows :
"The la>v of self-defense is founded on the principle of
either actual or
and in order to justify
of human life on this ground the slayer, as a reasonperson, rmcst have reason to believe and rnttst believe
there is a
great bodily harm; and
the circumstances must be such that an ordinarily
reasonable person, if stwh person were in those oircurnstances
and 'if such person knew and saw what Sitch person in real
or
knows and sees, would believe that it
was necessary for such person to use, in one's defense and
to avoid great
to one's
such force or means
as
cause the death of the
" (Italics added.)
'' Y ott w'ill note that actual danger is not necessary to
If one is confronted by the appearance
which arouses in his
as a reasonable person
an honest conviction and fear that he is about to suffer death
reasonable man in a like
would be jttstiand if the person so
such appearances and
his right of selfthe same whether such danger is real or merely
Even if in the light of after-acquired information
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), 94
held that under the
instruction as to the vv''"·"v"'"'
for reversal. But in that
not appear to have
last hereinabove
act upon known facts as well as
circumstances
to the
instruction as to the
to act in self-defense appears to
have been related to "the bnrnediate circumstances surroundthe encounter" and the court in its ruling stated that
''as there could be no
that . . . the
'immediate circumstances' would not divert their [the jury's]
attention from the
the giving of the
instruction
them to consider the previous threats was
made more
''
in the Torres case
it does not appear that the court's attention was directed to
or that it considered any failure of the requested instruction
to
that the defendant actually believe or be made
more apprehensive by the communicated threat. It is also
noted that the instruction approved in the Torres case is
taken from one which had been
in People v. Grriharn
, 62 Oal.App. 758, 765 [217 P. 823]. In the Graham
case,
the instruction was not held to be a necessary
or even proper one to be given; it was merely held in affirming
the judgment of conviction that "The instructions . , . given
sufficiently covered the
"
While the trial court in the
case could well have
modified the proposed instruction to include the elements
of bona fide belief in the threats or some measure of apprehension added thereby, in my opinion it cannot properly be
such instruction in
held that the court erred in
the form
To have
it as
would
}Jave created a conflict between it and the instruction which
''The law of self-defense is founded on the
either actual or
and in order
of human life on this ground the
as a reasonable person, must have reason to believe and rnust
believe that there is a
of receiving
bodily harm.''
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In any event it appears that the entire
on the
of self~defense was fair and
stance
and the refusal of this
and the failure to

instruc~

of self-defense
The
does
probable, as
to threaten
there is evithat if Dr. Moore assaulted defendant,
he did so in a vain
to disarm her and saYe his own
life; that defendant initiated a show of violence by displaying
the gun; that she created a situation in which Dr. Moore.
rather than
have the
of acting
in self~defense.
Defendant refers to her testimony that Dr. Moore ran
through the
swore at her, and struck her, asserts that
he was acting in violation of the order by ·which he was
enjoined from
her, and says, "Where, we ask, is
this evidence
of an inference that he was acting
lawfully."
defendant's
of the events
immediately
the
does not indicate that Dr.
Moore was
as previously pointed
out, other evidence from which the jury could, and under
established law we should presume did, infer that she deliberately incited the affray and did not thereafter put herself
in a position where she was jnstified in using deadly force,
anrl that Dr. Moore struck defendant in an effort to disarm
her. On such entirely tenable view of the evidence the last
quoted instruction is not an erroneous statement of law.
Defendant complains of the playing before the jury of
tapE' recordings of conversations between the defendant and
dt>ct>ased. \Vhen she first raised this point on appeal she
were in
inaudible and unasserted that the
intelligible. She relied upon
v. Stephens (1953), 117
Cal.App.2d
660
P.2d
, where it was held that
"to be admissible in t>vidence, the conversations aR recorded,
And if not, the witness
should be audible and
who had the conversations should be called to testify." In
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what can be heard
at that time~" and she testified that it was.
Defendant's
that the
were
was advanced for the first time after she had taken her appeaL
The original
of the
as
in the courtroom is
with asterisks; according to a
filed affidavit of the court reporter,
the asterisks were used to indicate both omissions of words
which he could not transcribe and to
pauses; the
reporter further avers that when he listens to a recording
without occasion to report it he can grasp its meaning without ascertaining each
but that in
to a recording as a reporter and attempting to coordinate his hearing,
understanding, and reporting, his task is more complex and
his understanding is below the standard of court reporting.
After the defendant advanced the contention on appeal
that the recordings should not have been played before the
jury because they were unintelligible, the People presented
to the trial court a more complete transcript of the recordings which had been prepared after the reporter had heard
and reported a replaying of the recordings ; the prosecuting
attorney offered defendant's counsel an opportunity to listen
to the recordings again and compare them with the proffered
transeript; defendant's counsel declined to do so; and the
trial court on the People's motion ordered that the more
complete transcript be substituted for the transcript of the
courtroom notes.
The People then obtained an order of the District Court
of AppeaF for augmentation of the record
supplemental
reporter's and clerk's transcripts of the last mentioned trial
c~ourt proceedings. Thereafter defendant moved the District
Court of Appeal to strike the supplemental transcripts from
ihe record, and this motion is now before us.
It does not appear that the playing of the recordings (which,
it will be remembered, were caused to be made by defendant)
•At the time of the motion the cause was pending before the District
Court of Appeal. It has since been transferred to this court.

Ill

could aff:ect the
-whether the
some nine months
For the reasons above stated the motion to strike the
transcripts should be denied; the judgment
and order appealed from should be affirmed.
concurred.
was denied November
were of

